Neither the
PKK/KCK nor the Justice and Development Party (AKP) rejected the meeting(s),
and how could they? The PKK/KCK had already hinted on several occasions that
they were meeting with the state directly and not just through imprisoned PKK/KCK
leader Abdullah Öcalan, who had been conducting meetings with a state committee
since 2010. The AKP accepted the meetings with Öcalan, but made the distinction
that it was ‘the state’ that was conducting these meetings and not ‘the
government.’ This was understandable during the run-up to the 2011 general election
as the opposition Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) and Nationalist Movement
Party (MHP) began accusing the AKP of treason and collaboration with the PKK,
which if it had stuck might have meant a loss of votes for the AKP amongst its
nationalist-conservative support. In reflex the AKP even took its rhetoric as
far as claiming that if they had been in power in 1999, when Abdullah Öcalan
was caught and handed over to Turkey ,
they would have carried out the capital punishment, which the MHP, who had been
in a coalition government at the time, hadn’t done. This threatening rhetoric
caused consternation amongst the Kurdish community and Kurdish politics and
Öcalan continued his wary approach regarding the meetings at Imrali, saying
that he wasn’t sure if the AKP wanted a democratic resolution or wanted to
eliminate the PKK/KCK by using him. Eventually he stated that the AKP had not
accepted the three protocols drawn up during negotiations and that the PKK and
the state were exploiting him and not doing what was needed of them for a
peaceful solution. This was on July 27th 2011; Öcalan hasn’t been
seen by lawyers or family since then, though he has the right to one hour and
half hour weekly meetings with lawyers and family members respectively.
Initially
discussion around the leak centred on who could have leaked it and why. Because
the leak first appeared on the Dicle News Agency (DIHA) website, which is
‘close’ to Kurdish politics, with the title ‘the hidden face of meetings will
ruin Erdoğan,’ fingers pointed to the Kurdish side and PKK. The first reaction
was that the PKK had done this to weaken the hand of the AKP before the Turkish
military’s cross-border operation into South Kurdistan (North
Iraq .) However a few hours after the leak was posted on their site
DIHA announced that they had been hacked and the audio recording put on the
site without their permission. Then the recording appeared on Vimeo and other
sites as well, which it could have been uploaded on initially. Was DIHA
targeted because of their proximity to the Kurdish side? It seems likely and
well calculated because the initial response by the parties that could have
shown an adverse reaction didn’t. The MHP perceived it as trying to prevent the
cross-border operation and declared that this should not deter the AKP from
military measures. The CHP were critical of the AKP for not accepting the
occurrence of the meetings and lying to the public during the elections, but
the feared public or party backlash did not occur.
The MIT
began an investigation into the matter after allegations that it could have
been someone or a group within the organisation, in conjunction with MOSSAD, who
may have leaked it to weaken the position of Hakan Fidan, appointed head of MIT
after a brief stint as Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry. The
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan immediately made a statement on his way from Egypt to Tunisia to support Fidan and it was
later reported that reinforcements would be appointed to MIT to consolidate
Fidan’s position. The fact that the Prime Minister was quick to defend Fidan
and then talk of reinforcements hitting headlines raises question marks that
have not been dispelled yet. Israel ’s
possible involvement was interpreted as retaliation against the flotilla crisis
and the strengthening of the AKP in the Middle East .
With the leak coming at a time when the Prime Minister was on a tour of the
‘Arab Spring’ countries was further proof of this according to some. If this
was the aim, Israel
haven’t been very successful, but it could be a first warning to the AKP.
According to ‘journalist’ Emre Uslu Israel intended to leak the
recording during the election to dent the AKP’s campaign but opted against this
as it would have the opposite effect amongst Kurds because the recording proves
that the AKP were pushing for a solution whereas the PKK were sabotaging it. However
it would be wise to state that Mr Uslu is mistaken because the PKK had not
begun retaliatory attacks until after the elections and that the Turkish
military had killed over 50 PKK guerrillas during April, May and June. So if the
recording had been leaked during the election campaign it would have probably
caused a greater stir for the AKP and would have strengthened the Peace and
Democracy Party (BDP) and the Kurdish Freedom Movement in general, because
Kurdish public opinion was aware of the meetings with Öcalan. The AKP's tone hardened following the Silvan attack (July 14th) in which 13 soldiers were killed. On the same day the Democratic Society Congress (DTK) declared 'Democratic Autonomy' and both these incidents combined gave the AKP the much needed excuse to officially end the dialogue process, though it had evidently ended with the victory of the BDP in the general elections and the clarification of Kurdish demands during the meetings with Abdullah Öcalan. The much abused rhetoric of 'the Kurds do not know what they want,' was put into circulation immediately after this to obscure the aggressive policy of the AKP and put the blame on the Kurdish side.
Meanwhile the Union of Communities in
Kurdistan (KCK) also rejected involvement in the leak and openly stated that
whoever had leaked the recording did not have good intentions. However they
accepted the meetings and said that they were being conducted in order to reach
a peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish issue, which they had always
favoured. Although the meetings had developed to a certain degree, the monist,
oppressive and aggressive approach of the AKP and the rejection of the
protocols by the government had ended the meetings they added. The BDP also
approached the leak positively and called for talks to be held openly with both
Öcalan and also the PKK/KCK. They highlighted the fact that their had not been
an uproar and that public opinion had reacted favourably for a more concrete
peace process to begin.
The AKP once again kept true to their
earlier rhetoric and said that it was the state that had conducted the meetings
and not the government. However some analysts and journalists were quick to
point out that Hakan Fidan had participated in the meeting as the
representative of the Prime Minister and clearly stated this during the meeting
on numerous occasions, as could be discerned from the recording. This places
the recording in the first months of 2010 when Fidan was the Undersecretary of
the Prime Ministry and not yet head of MIT. The AKP have tried to shadow this
fact and most of the media have obligingly helped them. The meetings have been
projected as being between the MIT and PKK and not a government representative and the PKK where an MIT agent is
also present and there is a representative (facilitator) from an unnamed
European country, who has a British English accent. This is a significant detail
that needs to be highlighted if the peace process is to develop any time soon
because as is evident from other similar peace processes it is not an abstract
entity such as ‘the state’ that takes responsibility for such issues but
concrete ‘governments’ that have majority support and can wield the correct
instruments to further the process. The AKP government for some reason are
shying away from assuming direct responsibility. Some may say it is fear of a
backlash from nationalist/conservative circles but this is not a believable
excuse anymore because it hasn’t materialised, and also because the AKP are
constantly claiming that they are still behind the democratisation process. Moreover
the AKP’s use of this argument is unsettling in that it implies that state
organs such as MIT are meeting with PKK/KCK officials not to develop a solution
but to create the basis for elimination. In a sense this is why the opposition
parties CHP and MHP are not opposing this policy. This is also the reason why
the PKK/KCK have been wary in their dealings with state organs because they
believe that this is the case. One can say that to overcome this deadlock the
AKP must claim direct responsibility for the meetings and abandon their current
conspiratorial tone.
Contrary to the conspiratorial tone of the
AKP, the tone of Hakan Fidan during the ‘Oslo 5’ meeting is
positive and respectful. The approaches of Sabri Ok and Mustafa Karasu are also
constructive and because of the previous meetings they have had the dialogue
between Afet Güneş and the PKK/KCK representatives is at times playful and
witty. Fidan brings news from Abdullah Öcalan and comments on his physical and
mental health and also praises Öcalan’s intellectual capacity. He calls Öcalan
‘Mr Öcalan,’ which is ironically considered a crime in Turkey for
which people are still in prison. It can also be discerned from the recording
that MIT have been passing on notes between Öcalan and the PKK/KCK and that the
government was placed in a quandary following the ‘Habur incident’ when peace
groups arrived from the Qandil mountains and were freed illegally by
prosecutors after their entrance. Afet Güneş blames the PKK/KCK representatives
for the lack of organisation they showed and they in turn raise the argument
that they couldn’t disclose to the Kurdish people that the peace groups had
arrived in agreement with the government. The unexpected celebrations which
ensued were interpreted by Turkish nationalist circles as a victory celebration
for the PKK and a campaign against Kurds began, leading to lynching in some
places. According to the recording and later developments it is clear that the ‘Habur
incident’ didn’t end meetings and negotiations.
Towards the end of the recording both parties begin discussing concrete steps that need to be taken for a solution. They complain to each other about the mistakes that have been made; Afet Güneş mentions the killing of 7 soldiers in Reşadiye, and Sabri Ok talks of continuing military operations. It is clear however that the PKK/KCK want steps to be taken immediately regarding the teaching of Kurdish language in schools and release of political prisoners, whereas the government/MIT say that they can only do so much in a certain space of time and that public opinion isn't ready and cannot be rushed. We do not know whether there was an 'Oslo 6,' however the leak shows that both parties had moved onto concrete negotiations.
Towards the end of the recording both parties begin discussing concrete steps that need to be taken for a solution. They complain to each other about the mistakes that have been made; Afet Güneş mentions the killing of 7 soldiers in Reşadiye, and Sabri Ok talks of continuing military operations. It is clear however that the PKK/KCK want steps to be taken immediately regarding the teaching of Kurdish language in schools and release of political prisoners, whereas the government/MIT say that they can only do so much in a certain space of time and that public opinion isn't ready and cannot be rushed. We do not know whether there was an 'Oslo 6,' however the leak shows that both parties had moved onto concrete negotiations.
The key moments in the recording arrives
when Hakan Fidan states that PM Erdoğan is 90 – 95% in agreement with Abdullah
Öcalan regarding a solution. So what has happened since early 2010 that
conflict and arrests have exacerbated? Why weren’t the protocols negotiated at
Imrali between Öcalan and the state committee accepted by the AKP? The PKK kept
to their promise of a ceasefire through the summer of 2010 up until the summer
of 2011. These ceasefires were extended by Öcalan on two occasions, however as
mentioned before the military operations of the Turkish Armed Forces continued
and ended in the deaths of over 50 PKK guerrillas. There were also nine
civilian deaths in Hakkari in September 2010 and the death of three Kurdish
children as well as the continuation of mass arrests and police attacks against
civilians. The release of Muslim fundamentalist Hezbol-kontra militants who had
carried out hundreds of killings of Kurdish patriots in the 1990s on behalf of
the deep state organisation JITEM was also viewed as a threat by the Kurdish
movement. All these incidents combined created a mistrust which was evident in
all the statements made by Öcalan, the BDP and PKK/KCK. However the Kurdish
side continued their good-will until July 27th, when Öcalan declared
that he was removing himself from negotiations.
The two weeks that have elapsed since the
leak has been an eventful and tragic period of time to say the least. Mass
arrests of BDP politicians and members has resumed in many cities across the
Kurdish region resulting in over 100 arrests in two weeks, totalling an amazing
1,356 arrests in six months. Amongst these were Şırnak Mayor Ramazan Uysal,
Silopi Mayor Emin Tuğurlu, Idil Mayor Resul Sadak and Silopi District Mayor
Bahattin Alkış who were arrested for attending meetings, reading press releases
and other flimsy charges. These latest arrests come after the claim by Haberturk, a national newspaper, that
security forces have a list of 1,500 people who they are going to arrest. It is
reminiscent of the former Prime Minister Tansu Çiller’s list of politicians and
businessmen who were later killed or imprisoned for aiding the Kurdish cause and
carries very bad memories for the Kurdish people. The Kurds have labelled the
arrest of over 3,000 BDP politicians and members as political genocide and a
hostage-taking situation instigated by the AKP. These are people who have not
participated in violent activity and indeed there have been no weapons
confiscated during police raids. So why are these political detainments and
arrests being carried out? Is this proof that the AKP want to eliminate the
Kurdish opposition? Liberal commentators are struggling to fathom why this is
happening and although they are criticising the mass arrests, they are not
pointing the finger at the AKP despite knowing that they are being carried out
by the Gulen Jamaat dominated police force. One
could argue that this is the nature of peace processes for the more powerful
party, which is generally the state, and that on one side they negotiate and on
the other they ‘try to pull the carpet out from under their opposition.’ This
is what they AKP are attempting to do and the Kurdish side are trying to keep
their feet firmly on the ground.
However this is too much of a
contradiction and even some MP’s within the AKP have voiced their concerns
regarding the arrests and the collapse of the democratic political sphere.
Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç commented that Şırnak Mayor Ramazan Uysal
would rather go to the mountains than to prison for 8 and a half years for a
bulletin he read. This is also the case for thousands of other people who are
faced daily with the threat of long term imprisonment. With these mass arrests
the state is doing nothing but opening the path of the mountain and armed
warfare rather than legal political struggle, which is requisite for the conflict
to end. The latest statement by Prime Minister Erdoğan following his arrival
from the UN Council in New York
was that the government would combat ‘terror’ and negotiate with the political
will of the people, which in this case is the BDP. However this cannot happen
as long as arrests continue and is a clear indication of the insincerity of the
Prime Minister. As he has done many times before the PM Erdoğan is once again
attempting to weaken the BDP by offering them a hand after he has knocked them
down. This ploy to weaken the BDP and force them to take the oath in Parliament
is a continuation of the policy that was put into practice following the
election; six of the BDP’s elected MP’s were not released from prison and one
of them (Hatip Dicle) had his MP mandate revoked and was replaced by an AKP
candidate.
Military operations continued alongside
police operations during the past two weeks and there was conflict in several
areas of Kurdistan . The Peoples’ Defence
Forces (HPG) carried out attacks against police officers and military
headquarters in Diyarbakır
and Siirt which led to the death of six soldiers and three guerrillas according
to state figures. The most harrowing incident occurred also in Siirt as HPG
guerrillas mistook six civilian women in a car for civilian police officers and
attacked the car. Four of the women were killed and two wounded. The HPG
apologised for the incident and sent their condolences to the family’s of the
victims and said they were carrying out a thorough investigation. What is
interesting is that some liberal and conservative writers and journalists are
now comparing the PKK to JITEM, the deep-state organisation which carried out
the extrajudicial killing of at least 17,000 Kurdish civilians. The obvious
difference that these writers are missing is that the HPG accepted
responsibility for its mistake and apologised, whereas the existence of JITEM
has still not been accepted by the state and their killing-machine not been
brought to justice. Moreover the four women who were killed were all Kurdish
and also sympathisers of the Kurdish cause. This matter is of some contention,
especially when considered together with the death of four Kurdish men (due to
a HPG attack) who were also actively involved in the Kurdish struggle in Batman,
whether certain groups within the HPG are getting false intelligence and being
misdirected to carry out such attacks. It is evident that the PKK/KCK have no
gain from this but they are still responsible for shedding some light on the
incident.
The incident in Siirt was followed by the
bomb explosion in Ankara
which killed three civilians. The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) claimed
responsibility and warned of further attacks if the isolation of Abdullah
Öcalan and attacks towards to the Kurdish people didn’t cease. Once again
despite accusations against the PKK/KCK, the KCK Executive Committee issued a
statement which condemned the action against civilians and said it was damaging
the legitimate struggle of the Kurdish people and denied any relations with
TAK. The KCK went as far as saying that the policies of the AKP were a mirror
of the attacks by TAK and that the government was provocating TAK into taking
uncontrolled action which would damage the joint future of the Kurdish and
Turkish people.
From this information and
analysis it can be seen that the leak has objectively contributed and developed
the peace process despite certain parties trying to use it as evidence of the
PKK sabotaging it. Once again it has also made it evident that the AKP government
are implementing a policy to weaken and eventually eliminate the Kurdistan
Freedom Movement. Detainments and arrests in the legal political sphere, the
isolation of Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan, continuing military operations in
Turkey and the threat of a cross-border operation which the Prime Minister has
once again confirmed shows that the meetings between the PKK/KCK and
government/MIT officials were geared towards prolonging the process so that the
AKP could reconsolidate its power in the 2010 referendum and then 2011 general
election, which they did. Collaboration with Iran ,
consultations between Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioğlu and
Iraqi authorities as well as Kurdish Regional Government President Massoud
Barzani, and agreements with the USA regarding Predator drones is
sufficient evidence to show that the AKP will lead one last military
attack to marginalise the PKK/KCK. However if previous forays into South
Kurdistan (North Iraq ) are anything to go by,
they will not be very successful. According to Wikileaks reports the cross
border operation into Zap in 2008 ended with the death of 150 soldiers. The Turkish
state had claimed that only 10 soldiers had died, whereas the PKK’s figures
were closer to the Wikileaks report. This will be an unjustifiable loss of life
and it will only lead back to square one; and that is the negotiation table. (Correction: According to Wikileaks reports 10 PKK guerrillas were killed. The Turkish state claimed they had killed 150 fighters, whereas PKK figures were similar to Wikileaks. Conversely the PKK claimed 117 soldiers had died in the 'Sun Operation' into Zap and the state said the figure was 24. Whatever the real figures many young men died.) Already Bülent Arınç has stated that meetings with top PKK/KCK officials may
continue, albeit with different names than the ones mentioned above. But once
again his tone was not sincere and he said something along the lines of ‘we
will try to influence and use them.’ This approach will not be accepted by the
Kurdish Movement neither will it be accepted by the Kurdish people. If a long lasting
solution is to be attained then it will need a just peace, where the Kurdish
people receive all their rights as a people. The constitution will need to
change substantially to guarantee these rights and the formation of a
‘Committee of Wise Men’ and ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ will need to
be formed to end the conflict. Any other approach will only lead to resistance
on behalf of the Kurdish people and conflict and war. The Kurdistan Freedom
Movement are struggling for a just peace, whereas the AKP only want to continue
their domination of Turkish politics and prolong their stay in power. For the process to resume negotiations between all parties, and all circles within society need to continue in a transparent manner, the isolation of Öcalan must cease and all military operations and attacks must stop on both sides. Then the talking can begin.
There are other issues which
also need to be addressed and which have been speculated and discussed in
length in the Turkish media, such as the nationality of the ‘facilitator,’
where the meetings were held, whether the recording was spliced together from
different meetings etc. However these are secondary to the issue at hand, and
that is whether the peace process can be continued with the current approach of
the Turkish state and AKP government which is now dominating the state
structure.
Note: The KCK is a larger organisation that also
harbours the PKK.
The HPG is the armed wing of the
PKK.
Memed Boran
25.09.2011
For further information and sources:
Memed Boran
25.09.2011
For further information and sources:
http://www.hudson-ny.org/2432/bdp-signals-boycott-end
http://www.haberanaliz.net/detay.asp?hid=86236
http://www.birgun.net/actuels_index.php?news_code=1316439885&day=19&month=09&year=2011
http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/670679-mit-pkk-kayitlarini-sizdiran-devlet-israil
http://firatnews.com/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=49968
http://firatnews.com/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=50237
http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/132839-alti-ayda-1356-bdpli-tutuklandi
http://firatnews.com/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=50237
http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-kurt-kokenli-annelere-seslendi/siyaset/siyasetdetay/25.09.2011/1442960/default.htm
http://bianet.org/english/minorities/130951-elected-mp-dicle-barred-from-parliament
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/batman-da-mayin-patlamasi-4-kisi-hayatini-kaybetti/turkiye/sondakika/01.08.2010/1270943/default.htm
http://firatnews.com/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=50250
http://www.haberler.com/pkk-gorusmeleri-surebilir-3014597-haberi/
http://www.haberler.com/pkk-gorusmeleri-surebilir-3014597-haberi/
http://www.trt.gov.tr/trtworld/en/newsDetail.aspx?HaberKodu=5eb21727-e40b-42bb-9916-b9b99af373d9
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/11/us-predator-drones-tukey_n_957558.html
Great article with an analytical depth!
ReplyDeleteCould you provide the U.S. diplomatic cable leaked by Wikileaks? (About Zap?). Than you.
ReplyDelete(Correction: According to Wikileaks reports 10 PKK guerrillas were killed. The Turkish state claimed they had killed 150 fighters, whereas PKK figures were similar to Wikileaks. Conversely the PKK claimed 117 soldiers had died in the 'Sun Operation' into Zap and the state said the figure was 24. Whatever the real figures many young men died.)
ReplyDelete